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Abstract
Relationships are a valuable technology to produce loans. (Berger and
Udell [1995], Petersen and Rajan [1994], Aoki and Dinç [2002]). While
there are convincing theories in which relationships solve hidden action or
hidden information problems, there is very little empirical corroboration
of either theory. In this paper, we assess the empirically validity of these
theories in the small ﬁrm credit market. While results suggest that re-
lationships are more valuable for ﬁrms with worse incentive misaligment
problems, more informationally opaque ﬁrms do not seem to extract more
value from relationships. Contrary to what most empirical research on the
value of relationships has assumed (but not tested), this indicates that re-
lationships are, at very least, as important for aligning incentives as they
are for solving hidden information problems.
I. Introduction
Repeated interaction between lenders and borrowers, often shorthanded as
Relational Lending, is viewed as a major technology for producing loans. In-
deed, there is convincing evidence that relationships are valuable for borrowers
such as small ﬁrms, in the sense that they increase access to credit, and better
terms of credit (Berger and Udell [1995] and Petersen and Rajan [1994]). Close
bank-ﬁrm ties are pervasive in several ﬁnancial systems, the Japanese Main
Bank and the German Universal Bank systems being but the two most promi-
nent examples. Despite this consensus, and the supporting evidence, there is
less understanding of the mechanism through which relationships facilitate the
production of loans. In this paper, we investigate the circumstances in which
∗Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio. This paper is companion to our “A Relational
Theory of Relationship Lending Under Contractual Incompleteness,” so we borrow heavily
from it in several parts.
1relationships are valuable to borrowers. More speciﬁcally, we are interested in
evaluating empirically whether relationships help alleviate hidden action, hidden
information problems, both, or none.
Theory provides conceivable explanations for hidden action and hidden in-
formation as the reason for relationships. On the one hand, in Rajan [1992],
Petersen and Rajan [1995], Boot and Thakor [2000], just to name a few, rela-
tionships are viewed as informed lending, to use Rajan’s [1992] terminology. By
interaction repeatedly, lenders can learn borrowers types, and overcome credit
rationing due to non-observability of types. On the other hand, in Bolton and
Scharfstein [1990], Boot and Thakor [1994] and Carrasco and De Mello [2006],
the dynamic nature of relationships help alleviating incentive misalignment be-
tween lenders and borrowers in a world of contractual incompleteness. In all
these papers, the continuation value of relationships is used to induce borrowers
to take actions preferred by lenders. In this sense, it is the dynamic nature of
relationships that create value.
In this paper, we confront both theories with data from small business credit
market. The empirical choice is driven by both data and the economics of the
small business lending. For small business, there is information available, for
a large number of ﬁrms, on the ﬁrm-lender relational characteristics, which
is a necessary condition for any empirical study of relationship lending. As
for the economics, relative to large, public-owned corporations, small ﬁrms are
considered informationally opaque. So it is an application in which hidden
information has more chance of being relevant. As for the disciplining story,
small ﬁrm lending is also a good application. Relationship lending for large
corporations tend to involve a large amount of “hands on” interim monitoring.
In the Japanese Main Bank case, for example, banks have board representation,
and are able to monitor, to a certain degree, decision-making in the process
(Aoki, Patrick and Sheard [1995[). The disciplinary role played by a relationship
in the literature involves using continuation values as a substitute for direct
interim monitoring. Therefore, one should expect the use of continuation value
as a substitute for monitoring when the size of the lender-borrower operation is
relatively small, since then it does not justify applying a monitoring mechanism
that may involve substantial ﬁxed costs.1 It seems then that small ﬁrm lending is
better than large corporation’s for testing disciplining stories based on “indirect
monitoring”, i.e., monitoring through the continuation value of the borrower-
lender relationship.
Despite the focus on small ﬁrm lending, these ﬁndings may be of broader
interest. Close ties between agents is a pervasive economic phenomenon. Me-
diating transactions through relationships are a substitute for market-mediated
transactions; therefore, one should observe the former in instances in which the
latter are imperfect. In this sense, the interest in identifying the exact mar-
ket failure that cause relationships to be valuable goes much beyond small ﬁrm
lending.
1These costs include, for instance, allocating a bank oﬃcial to operate inside the ﬁrm, and
opportunity costs of alocating high-level manager to participate in board activities.
2As as preview of results, relationships are more valuable for ﬁrms facing
more serious incentive problems, and for ﬁrms that are more informationally
problematic. While this implies that both explanations seem operative in small
ﬁrm lending, the evidence supporting the disciplining story is stronger. This
result is somehow surprising given the implicit assumption of the banking liter-
ature that the ﬁrst-order reason for relationship lending for small ﬁr m si sh i d d e n
information.
Our ﬁndings have also policy implications. Over the last twenty years, the
banking industry has, both in the United States and worldwide, experienced
uninterrupted consolidation. In the US, this process has engendered, among
scholars, pratictioners and policy makers, considerable concern about small ﬁrm
lending.2 Consolidation has produced larger, more organizationally complex
banks, and there are theoretical reasons, and supporting empirical evidence,
that large banks refrain from lending based on soft, private information (Stein
[2002], Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein [2005], Berger, Rosen and
Udell [2005], Berger and Udell [2002]). Therefore, larger banks would avoid
using relationship lending, which is perceived to be crucial for small ﬁrm lending.
While it is reasonable to assume that large banks have a disadvantage in
acquiring and using private information, it does not seem to be the case that
t h es a m eh a n d i c a pp r e v a i l si nt h eu s eo fc o ntinuation values of relationships
as disciplining mechanism. Indeed, the empirical evidence concerning the over-
all ability of large banks to lend to small ﬁrms is ambiguous, contrary to one
would expect if hidden information problems were the only working force behind
relationship lending.3
Beyond changes in structure, increased bank competition could be viewed as
a challenge to relationships lending, since competition decreases the returns to
private information acquisition (Petersen and Rajan [1995], Boot and Thakor
[2005], Aoki and Dinç [2000]). These concerns. however, are only relevant if hid-
den information problems are the only reason behind the value of relationships,
i.e., if relationships are mainly a technology to produce private information. If
the disciplining reason - as in Bolton and Scharfstein [1990], Boot and Thakor
[1994], and Carrasco and De Mello [2006], is also relevant, then these concerns
are less relevant. In fact, Carrasco and De Mello [2006], for example, show
that relationship lending equilibria arise even under the assumption that banks
compete away their proﬁts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data, and the
borrowers (small ﬁrms) that are our object of study. Section III explains the
empirical strategy. Results are in section IV. Section V concludes.
2For studies on the eﬀects of bank mergers on small ﬁrm ﬁnance in the United States,
see Berger, Kashyap and Scalise [1995], Rhoades [2000], Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell
[1998], Peek and Rosengreen [1996] and Strahan and Weston [1996].
3See Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich [2004], Berger, Kashyap and Scalise
[1995], Berger, Demsetz and Strahan [1999], Rhoades [2000], and IMF [2001].
3II. Data
The data source is the National Survey of Small Business Finances 1987
(NSSBF 1987), and the Surveys of Small Business Finances1993 and 1993 (SSBF
1998, SSBF 1998), performed by the Federal Reserve Board. An observation
is a ﬁrm. Each survey is composed of a cross section of small ﬁrms (less than
500 employees). Although some questions diﬀer among survey, the data is, in
general, comparable between surveys.
To test the theoretical ideas in section II, one needs, at the very minimum,
data on the characteristics of the ﬁrm-lender relationship, and of usage of credit.
The SSBFs contain this data. To the best of author’s knowledge, there is no
other source with such data. First, there is a rich set of information on the
ﬁrm’s use of ﬁnancial products, including substitutes to formal bank credit, such
as trade credit. There is also information on the characteristics of the ﬁrms’
relationship with their suppliers of ﬁnancial products. Of particular interest is
the information on the number of ﬁnancial institutions the ﬁrm does business
with, and the length of relationship with ﬁnancial institutions. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, there is no other data set with such rich set of information.
The data has, however, some drawbacks. One is the poor information on
interest rates. Interest rates on bank loans are available only for the most recent
approved loan At the 1998, for example, there are interest rate observations for
no more than one quarter of the ﬁrms, which severely restricts the sample size
if one would explain interest rates. As for interest rates on trade credit, only
information from the most important supplier of trade credit is available.
Table I describes the variables, and provides some summary statistics. A
typical ﬁrm in the data set is an eleven-year-old proprietorship managed by
its owner. In 1998, for example, only a tiny fraction (0.39%) of the ﬁrms in
our data set were public held, and 88.71% of them had three owners or less.4
This is the ﬁrst interesting feature about this dataset: these borrowers seem
informationally opaque. The typical ﬁrm is quite small: the median number
of employees is 5, with U$127,000 in assets. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to conjecture that economies of scale are such that lender would not perform
interim, direct monitoring on these ﬁrms.
As for banking relationships, the typical ﬁrm does business with 2 ﬁnan-
cial institutions for 6 years, which is slightly less than half the age of the ﬁrm.
Therefore, relationships seem important for an average ﬁrm. There is, however,
signiﬁcant variation in the relationship variable: while most ﬁrms do concen-
trate their banking business, roughly 36% do business with 3 or more ﬁnancial
institutions. See Figure 5. Length of relationships vary wildly, with a standard
deviation slightly larger than the mean.
Table I also shows summary statistics for a particular sub-sample of ﬁrms,
t h o s et h a tw e r eo ﬀered Early Discount Payments (EPDs) oﬀers from trade credit
4Numbers for 1987 and 1993 are very similar.
4suppliers. This sub-set will be crucial in our estimation strategy, and it is
i m p o r t a n tt h a tt h e s eﬁrms are not systematically diﬀerent from ﬁrms that did
not receive EPDs oﬀers. Next section contains a more detailed discussion on
this issue.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the banking market 
firm is located. 1, if HHI>1800; 0, otherwise
Credit Score**
1, if low risk; 2, if moderate risk; 3 if average risk; 4 
if significant risk; 5 if high risk
Limited 1 if firm if a limited liability, 0 otherwise
Owner 
Delinquent***
1, if main owner firm was more than 30 days 
delinquent in the previous 3 years; 0, otherwise
Firm 
Delinquent***
1, if firm was more than 30 days delinquent in the 
previous 3 years; 0, otherwise
Cash/Assets Cash-in-hand/Assets 0.08 0.09
Table I Source: FED NSSBF 1987, SSBF 1993, 1998. * Firms with no banking relationships excluded. ** 
Only 1998. *** Only 1998 and 1993
Median





Number of financial institutions firm does business 
with







Age of Firm Age of firm, in years
Employee Number of employee
Assets Assets in thd of dollars 127 273
MSA
1 if firm located at a Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 
otherwise
Length Length of Relation with Main Bank, in years
Definition Median
EPDs
1, if took advantage of no Early Payment Discounts; 
2, if less than half; 3 if half; 4 if more than half; 5 if 
all
III. Empirical Strategy
The data provides enough information to distinguish ﬁrm according to the
theoretically relevant dimension. The identiﬁcation strategy depends crucially
5on variation among ﬁrms in three dimensions: the characteristics of their bank-
ing relationships; the organization structure of ﬁrms; and on how informationally
challenged they are.
A. The Performance Measure and the Speciﬁcation5
Our interest is assessing the determinants of the value of the lender-borrower
relationship. Value could be evaluated through prices or quantities, also called
availability of credit in the banking literature parlance. The choice of quantity
as a measure of value is both theory and data driven. First, as noted above,
interest rate information is poor, not allowing enough variation to recover any-
thing meaningful. Furthermore, the empirical literature has been much more
succesful when credit availability is used (Petersen and Rajan [1995], and De
Mello [2006]). Second, it is not exactly clear what the theoretical predictions
are for interest rates. If relationships mainly solve hidden information problems,
then interest rates could well be higher for relational ﬁrm. If relationships are a
disciplining device, interest rate in relational transactions are lower than in the
arm’s length market (Boot and Arnaud [1994], Carrasco and De Mello [2006]).
As for quantities, predictions are clear: relationships, whether producing pri-
vate information or disciplining borrow e r s ,s h o u l db ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hah i g h e r
availability of credit.
The economic object of interest is the ﬁrm level supply of credit. If the
econometrician observed quantities supplied and demanded, her task would be
simple: endogeneity stems from only observing equilibrium quantities Trade
credit information available SSBF allows for the identiﬁcation strategy of argu-
ing that ﬁrm level supply of credit is observed, albeit imperfectly.6 Following
Petersen and Rajan [1995] and De Mello [2006], information on trade credit is
used to proxy the ﬁrm level supply of credit.
Trade credit is ﬁnance provided by the ﬁrms’ suppliers of inputs (other than
capital) by allowing ﬁrms to pay for goods after the delivery date. Conversely,
trade credit suppliers also oﬀer Early Payment Discounts (henceforth, EPD),
which are discounts for payment before the contracted payment date.
An important piece of information arise, which was successfully used by
Petersen and Rajan [1995] and De Mello, is the percentage of EPD oﬀers the
ﬁrm took advantage of. Forgoing EDPs carries an implicit interest rate, which is
very high. For example, in 1998, while 80.4%. of the ﬁrms which received EPD
oﬀers from their most important suppliers carried an implicit annual interest
rate of more than 40%, the average interest rate on the most recent bank loan is
9.04%. Given this diﬀerence, if a ﬁrm is not taking advantage of 100% of EPDs
it must be that it is either cash or bank credit constrained. After controlling
for cash-in-hand, the percentage of EPDs oﬀers the ﬁrm took advantage of
5This section draws heavily on De Mello [2006].
6An alternative strategy is to use ﬁnancial ratios, such as Bank Loans
Assets .T h e s e m e a s u r e s ,
however, are endogenous: they contain both supply and demand on them.
6eﬀectively measures the ﬁrm level supply of credit. Below, it is shown that the
measure is reasonable empirically. For example, as one would expect, ﬁrms with
more cash-in-hand take more advantage of EPDs.
Let EPDi (%EPDs, for example) be the proxy for credit supply. RLi is a
measure of whether the transaction between ﬁrm i and banks is relationship-
based. Let Zi be a variable that aﬀects how market power shifts the supply of
credit for relational ﬁrms. It is either a measure of how costly it is to acquire
and use private information, or a measure of how informationally problematic
the ﬁrm is. Finally, let (IRi − BRi) be the measure of how advantageous it is
to take advantage of the EPD. The ideal speciﬁcation is:
EPDi = γ0 + γ1RLi + γ2 (IRi − BRi)+ΛControlsi + εi (1)
Parameters in (1) are estimated for diﬀerent subsamples of ﬁrms, according
to two criteria. First, organizational structure provides variation to split the
sample according to how serious the incentive misalignment between the ﬁrm
and lenders is. As it is argued in subsection, the identiﬁcation hypothesis is
that limited liability ﬁrms should face more serious incentive problems than
unlimited liability ﬁrms. Second, according to how pervasive the problem of
hidden information, which is measured by Credit Score
The following hypothesis are tested. For the whole sample, we expect, as the
literature has already established, that relationships are valuable, i.e., γ1 > 0.I f
relationships are solve hidden action problems, the relationships should be more
valuable for ﬁrms for which hidden action problems are more severe, i.e., limited
liability ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we expect γlimited
1 >γ unlimited
1 . Similarly for




Of course, not all ﬁrms receive trade credit from suppliers (and consequently
are not oﬀered EPDs). Thus, sample selection may bias results. Table I, how-
ever, suggests sample selection is not important empirically: ﬁrms in the re-
gression sub-sample do not seem diﬀerent from ﬁrms in the whole sample. By
inspection, the two groups of ﬁrms have very similar means and median for all
relevant variables, except for size and organizational structure: these ﬁrms are
larger, and there are more limited liability ﬁrms among them. There is, however,
signiﬁcant variation in size and organizational structure among them, which al-
lows us to recover the parameters of interest in (1). More importantly, however,
is that ﬁrms in general and ﬁrms that received EPD oﬀer are not very diﬀer-
ent in two dimensions. First, their credit score in 1998 are quite alike, which
indicates risk does not vary systematically between with receiving trade credit.
Second, although ﬁrms that received EPD oﬀers seem slightly more relational
than the general population, the relationship measures are quite similar.
IRi and BRi are not observed.7 Evidently, IRi − BRi is in error term,
and could aﬀect both, and be aﬀected, by RLi.I n t h i s c a s e , i d e n t i ﬁcation is
7Although very imprecisely measured, one could use the interest rate on the most recent
loan for BR, and implicit interest rates on EPDs by the most important trade credit supplier
for IR. This strategy is, however, too costly. Only a small subset of ﬁrms applied for loans
in recent periods, and received cash discount oﬀers from the most important trade credit
supplier. Thus, including these variables severely decreases the sample size.
7by exclusion: omitting them is not a serious problem. All that matters to the
demand for EPDs, for example, is the diﬀerence between bank credit interest
rate and the implicit interest rate in forgoing EPDs, IRi − BRi.T r a d ec r e d i t
tends to be very highly priced, relative to bank loans, and thus variations of this
variable, at the relevant range, are not likely to inﬂuence the decision to take
advantage of EPDs: one should take advantage of as much EPDS as possible.8
Controlsi include variables that might aﬀect both Xi and RLi.F i r s t a n d
foremost, measures of quality of the ﬁrm are included. The ﬁrst is Credit Score.
The second is Owner Delinquency, which is a categorical variable for whether
the owner of ﬁrm was 60 days or more delinquency on personal obligations in the
previous 3 years. They capture how informationally problematic ﬁrms are. This
control is crucial to our purposes since the measure of incentive misalignment,
limited liability, could also capture diﬀerent degrees of informational opaqueness.
Other controls are the amount of cash-in-hand, which determines EPDs and
tardiness and could vary systematically with relational strength, size of ﬁrm,
measured both by assets and number of employees, and age of ﬁrm, which
measures both how established the ﬁrm is, and degree of relational strength.
Finally, characteristics of the location of ﬁrms are included, such as bank market
concentration and whether the ﬁrm is located at an MSA.
B. Measuring the Degree of Relational Strength
The empirical banking literature has used two measures of relational strength:
length of ﬁrm-bank relationship and number of banks the ﬁrm does business
with (see Berger and Udell [1995], Petersen and Rajan [1994], Cole [1998], De
Mello [2006], among others). The former is self-evident: longer interaction both
produce private information, and indicate repeated interaction that is essential
to disciplining in the spirit of Boot and Thakor [1994] and Carrasco and De
Mello [2006]. As for the latter, if relationships are valuable, one would expect
concentration of operations, just as one would expect dispersed operations in
arm’s length mediated transactions.
In this paper, we innovate by presenting a slightly diﬀerent measure. First,
we create an index of relational strength based on both measures used by the lit-
erature. More speciﬁcally. We use factor analysis to project variation from both
measures into a single dimension. The inverse of the number of banking insti-
tutions the ﬁrm does business with, and the log of the ratio
Length with main bank
Age of ﬁrm
enter the factor analysis. We call this measure relational.
The second innovation is how length is measured.9 The rationale behind the
measure is that a three year old relationship for a ten year old ﬁrm means less,
in terms of use of relationship lending, than the same three years of relationship
8Using only data on the most important trade credit supplier, the median implied interest
rate on forgoing EPDS was 43% a.a. in 1993.
9Only length, not the length/age, has been used so far. See Berger and Udell [1995] and
Petersen and Rajan [1994].
8f o ras i xy e a ro l dﬁrm. Additionally, by measuring length in this way, years of
relationship in equation (1) becomes a cleaner measure of the eﬀect of age on
credit availability.10 However, a twenty year old ﬁrm with 10 years of banking
relationship is diﬀerent than a two year old ﬁrm with one year of banking re-
lationship. This suggests that
Length with main bank
Age of ﬁrm is more informative for older
ﬁrms. We incorporate this fact by weighting our factor loads estimation by the
age of ﬁrm, i.e., by allowing older ﬁrms to have more weight in the estimation
procedure of the measure relational.
C. Limited Liability as a Measure of Incentive Misalignment
By sheltering personal assets, limited liability protects entrepreneurs from
excessive exposure in case of bankruptcy. Two well known implications of lim-
ited liability for an entrepreneur’s incentives are the following. First, because
it prevents entrepreneurs from facing the whole distribution of returns, it puts
incentives to excessive risk-taking from the lenders, with consequent credit ra-
tioning (Stiglitz and Weiss [1982]). Second,by impeding the design of an in-
centive contract that makes the entrepreneur the full residual claimant of the
beneﬁts of his eﬀort, limited liability leads to shirking. However, limited liability
also worsens hidden information problems. Indeed, Stiglitz and Weiss’s theory
of an upward sloping credit supply schedule is compatible with both ﬁrms tak-
ing excessive risks and intrinsically riskier ﬁrms being more willing to borrow
at higher interest rates. Additionally, limited liability ﬁrms could be perceived
as riskier.
Our empirical strategy rests on the identiﬁcation hypothesis that limited
liability worsens incentive problems. For that to be true, one needs, at the very
minimum, that limited liability to be associated with “bad behavior” in some
sense. Even if that holds empirically, there is the competing hypothesis is that
limited liability ﬁrms are intrinsically worse types, which also rationalizes bad
outcomes. While one cannot decide in favor of either hypothesis unequivocally,
one can perform some tests on the implications of each story. Table II is infor-
mative with this respect. The dependent variable is whether the ﬁrm has at least
once been delinquent in the three years previous to the survey (1998).11 In col-
umn (1), one can see that, even after controlling for availability for cash-in-hand,
equity, size (as measured by assets and employment), and age of ﬁrm, limited
liability is associated with a higher probability of being delinquent, 3.31% more
(p-value 3.2%). Limited liability seems indeed associated with bad outcomes.
If limited liability did indeed capture bad type, one would respect that in-
cluding a measure of type would wipe out the results in column (1). In column
10If length alone, no the ratio is included, age becomes a control for fact that longer rela-
tionships often occur for older ﬁrms. When the ratio in included, this fact is already controlled
for in the measure, and the model allows more ﬂexibility for age to capture whatever eﬀect it
should have.
11We only use 1998 data because is the only one that contains data on credit score.
9(3), credit score, which proxy for type, is added to the speciﬁcation described
above. Results are, if anything, stronger than in column (1). Since ﬁrm delin-
quency might determine credit score, the equation is also estimated with only
owner delinquency, and results are similar if not stronger. Finally, delinquency
in over the previous three years, so we also estimate the model excluding ﬁrms
younger than 4 years, and results still hold.12
Firm Delinquent previous 3 years?
  (1) (2) (3)  †(4) 
3.31 3.83 3.71 3.39  Limited Liability 
(1.44)** (1.40)***  (1.33)*** (1.57)** 
-12.05 -10.16  -9.52 -10.53  Log(Relational)  (2.01)*** (1.85)*** (1.84)*** (1.98)*** 
   0.0514   Credit Score     (0.0055)***   
 11.62  10.25  12.57  Owner Delinquent?    (0.66)*** (0.66)*** (0.75)*** 
-2.87 -1.80 -1.43 -1.78  Log(Cash/Assets)  (0.37)*** (0.35)*** (0.34)*** (0.38)*** 
-5.04 -4.97 -4.28 -4.89  Equity‡  (2.21)** (2.05)** (1.83)** (2.05)** 
2.07 2.06 1.67 2.13  Log(Employee)  (0.60)*** (0.58)*** (0.56)*** (0.64)*** 
-1.63 -1.31 -0.18 -3.70  Log(Age of Firm)  (0.70)** (0.69)*  (0.68) (1.00)*** 
-1.98 -0.81 -0.51 -0.79  Log(Assets)  (0.0041)*** (0.40)**  (0.38)  (0.45)* 
Observations  3395 3395 3395 2918 
Table II Source FED, SSBF 1998. Dependent variable is 1, if firm was ever delinquent more than 60 days in the previous 
3 years. Robust standard errors  in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal 
probit estimates, in % points. †: only firms older than 3 years included. ‡: coefficients are multiplied by 10
7. Sector and 
regional dummies included. 
 
Firms might choose limited liability precisely because they know they are bad
types, and the causality would run the reverse way. Although there is no source
of exogenous variation to estimate the eﬀect of limited liability on delinquency
free of this reverse causality, there is exogenous variation to determine whether
ﬁrms choose limited liability anticipating delinquency.
12Indeed, age of ﬁrm has the strongest (expected) negative eﬀect on delinquency.
10Limited Liability? 
  (1)  †(2)  †(3)   †(4)  †(5)/IV Probit   (6)/IV Probit 
7.59 6.02 3.49 4.13 -4.95  -3.83  Firm Delinquent? 
(3.15)** (3.36)*  (2.96)  (2.92)  (7.98)  (6.86) 
-6.44 -7.56  -7.53      -0.0712  Log(Relational)  (3.59)* (3.77)** (3.77)**      (0.0353)** 
-1.81 -1.93        -1.23  Credit Score  (1.00)* (1.06)*        (1.10) 
-1.44 -1.22          Owner Delinquent?  (1.30) (1.40)         
1.16 1.14 1.31        Log(Cash/Assets)  (0.69)* (0.70) (0.71)*       
-7.36 -6.82  -6.86      -7.59  Equity‡  (3.67)** (3.63)*  (3.57)*      (3.78)** 
15.14 15.29 15.23  16.62 15.88  15.60  Log(Employee)  (0.10)*** (0.11)*** (1.10)*** (1.07)**  (1.02)***  (0.97)** 
-3.45 -3.82  -3.38 -2.77 -3.26  -3.39  Log(Age of Firm)  (1.19)*** (1.62)*** (1.60)***  (1.55)*  (1.62)***  (1.18)*** 
4.48 4.14 4.32 3.27 4.22  4.20  Log(Assets)  (0.69)*** (0.75)*** (0.74)*** (0.55)*** (0.63)***  (0.61)*** 
Observations  3395 2918  2918 3036 2982  3395 
Table III Source FED, SSBF 1998. Dependent variable is 1, if firm was ever delinquent more than 60 days in the previous 3 years. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal probit estimates, in % 
points. †: only firms older than 3 years included. ‡: coefficients are multiplied by 10
7. Sector and regional dummies included. IV Probit 
procedure: instruments are owner delinquent and Log(Cash/Assets).  
 
As hinted by the results in table II, when OLS is estimated it seems that
ﬁrms choose limited liability anticipating delinquency (column (1)). When the
sample is restricted to ﬁrms older than three years, (column (2)), results start
to vanish (column (2)). Interestingly, results only arise when type is controlled
for with credit score and owner delinquency (column (3)). In column (4), not
only the sample in restricted to ﬁrms older than three years, but all regressors
that are not reasonably established characteristics of the ﬁrm, and therefore
most likely did not inﬂuence the organizational structure choice, are omitted.
In this case, future ﬁrm delinquency does not appear to aﬀect limited liability.
It is noteworthy that, if anything, worse ﬁrms, as measured by credit and owner
liability, seem to choose more unlimited liability forms (columns (1) and (2)).
This could be because unlimited liabilities are worse types, which would only
reinforce the result that limited liability induces bad behavior.
Columns (1) to (3) in table III, and results in table II, suggest an iden-
tiﬁcation strategy for controlling for reverse causality. It appears that, while
anticipation of owner delinquency does not aﬀect organizational choice, it does
aﬀect ﬁrm delinquency. This is expected since limited liability concerns ﬁrm
bankruptcy, and owner delinquency might aﬀect her ability to fund the ﬁrm.
Same seems true about cash-in-hand, which is does not seem to consistently
determine limited liability, and does determine delinquency (as it would be ex-
11pected). In columns (5) and (6) the model is estimated using Log(Cash) and
owner delinquency as instruments.13 When the reverse causality is accounted
for, results not only disappear but become negative, both when the whole sam-
p l ei su s e d( c o l u m n( 6 ) )a n dw h e ni ti sr e s t r i c t e dt oﬁrms older than three years
(column (5)).14
Results in tables II and III makes us comfortable with the assumption that
limited liability induces “bad behavior”. Limited liability is associated with
more delinquency, and this result is rather robust to including measures of ﬁrm
type. Furthermore, reverse causality does not seem to drive results: estimates
indicate bad type ﬁrms do not choose limited liability anticipating high proba-
bility of defaulting.
IV. Results
A. The value of relationships according to limited liability
In table IV, shows the estimates of the parameters in (1) for limited and
unlimited liability ﬁrms, in terms of EPDs oﬀer taken advantage of. Starting
at column (6), one can see that relationships have value. The ordered probit
0.22 estimate means, economically, that a ﬁrm 10% more relational than the
average ﬁrm has 8.3% more chance of taking advantage of all EPDs oﬀered.
Other estimates are either expected by theory, or consistent with what has been
documented in the literature. Older ﬁrms with more cash-in-hand take more
advantage of EPDs. Larger ﬁrms as measured by assets take more advantage of
EPDs, but ﬁrms with more employees take advantage of less EPDs. Urban ﬁrms
and ﬁrms in more concentrated bank markets take less advantage of EPDs.15
13Credit score would another candidate. There is however, slightly more evidence that it de-
termine limited liability choice. Results are very similar if credit score is used as an additional
instrument.
14For consistency, when the whole sample is used current variables such as equity and
credit score are included. When the sample is restricted, only “fundamental characteristics”
variables, such as size and age are included. Results are very similar if they were always
included or excluded.
15The result that take urban ﬁrms take more advantage of EPDs was already in Petersen
and Rajan [1995]. Bank market concentration implies less bank credit for 1998 is in De Mello
[2006]. This result, however, was the opposite in 1987 (Petersen and Rajan [1995]).
12Early Payment Discounts
  †(1)  ‡(2)  † (3)  ‡ (4)  §(5)  (6) 
0.33 0.04 0.26 0.05 0.25 0.22  Log(Relational) 
(0.11)*** (0.19) (0.11)** (0.20) (0.12)**  (0.10)** 
   -0.21  -0.23  -0.25  -0.22  Credit Score      (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** 
   -0.09  -0.15  -0.08  -0.10  Owner Delinquent?     (0.05)**  (0.08)*  (0.05)  (0.04)** 
0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05  Log(Cash/Assets)  (0.02)*** (0.04) (0.02)*** (0.04) (0.02)**  (0.02)*** 
-0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06  Log(Employee)  (0.04)** (0.06) (0.04)* (0.06) (0.04)*  (0.03)** 
0.15 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.11  Log(Age of Firm)  (0.05)*** (0.07)***  (0.05)*  (0.07)*  (0.05)*  (0.04)*** 
0.08 -0.00  0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.02  Log(Assets)  (0.03)***  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
-0.26 -0.19 -0.23 -0.17 -0.19 -0.20  MSA  (0.09)*** (0.14) (0.09)** (0.13)  (0.10)*  (0.08)*** 
-0.10 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11  HHI  (0.07)  (0.11) (0.07)* (0.11) (0.07)*  (0.06)** 
Observations  1022 431 1022 431  860 1453 
Table IV Source FED, SSBF 1998. Dependent variable is 5, if firm took advantage of all EPDs, 4 if most of the time, 3 if 
around half the time, 2 if few times, 1 if never. Ordered Probit estimates. Robust standard errors  in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. †: limited liability firms. ‡: unlimited liability firms. §: 
limited liability firms managed by their owners. Sector and Region dummies included. 
 
In column (1) only limited liability ﬁrms are in the sample, and the proxies
for type of ﬁrm (credit score and owner delinquent) are omitted. In column (2)
shows the same for unlimited liability ﬁr m s .O n ec a ns e eam a r k e dd i ﬀerence:
while relationships are valuable for limited liability ﬁrms, they seems not valu-
able for unlimited liability ones. Economically, the ordered probit coeﬃcients
mean that, a limited liability ﬁrm 10% more relational than an average limited
liability ﬁrm has 12.7% more chance of taking advantage of 100% of EPDs (p-
value = 0.3%). For an unlimited liability ﬁrm , this eﬀect is 1.5%, but it is not
precisely estimated (p-value = 84.2%). Columns (3) and (4) show this diﬀerence
is not produced by omitting credit worthiness. When credit score and owner
delinquency are included, the diﬀerence still arises.
As a last robustness check, we estimate the value of relationship only for lim-
ited liability ﬁrms managed by their owners. Since unlimited liability implies
the owners’ and unlimited partners’ assets are in the line, it seems reasonable
that the results should arise when only owner-managed ﬁrms are included. The
result still arises, despite the smaller sample size. This also indicates the diﬀer-
ence between unlimited and limited liability ﬁrms is not due to smaller sample
size on unlimited liability ﬁrms.
In table V, the other survey years are added. The estimated model is less
satisfactory, for the lack of information on credit score for 1993 and 1987. For
131993, one still observes whether the owner of the ﬁr mw a sd e l i n q u e n ta ts o m e
point in the previous three years.
Early Payment Discounts
  (1) †(2)  ‡(3) (4) †(5)  ‡(6) 
0.47 0.52 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.16  Log(Relational) 
(0.06)*** (0.07)***  (0.12)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)***  (0.15) 
    -0.47  -0.43  -0.57  Owner Delinquent?        (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** 
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05  Log(Cash/Assets)  (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07  Log(Employee)  (0.02)** (0.02) (0.03)**  (0.02)** (0.02) (0.04)* 
0.21 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.14  Log(Age of Firm)  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** 
0.02  0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.02  Log(Assets)  (0.01) (0.02)** (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02)** (0.03) 
-0.20 -0.23 -0.11 -0.23 -0.28 -0.12  MSA  (0.04)*** (0.05)***  (0.07)*  (0.05)*** (0.06)***  (0.09) 
0.02 0.02 0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.08  HHI  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Observations  5462 3728 1734 3599 2571 1028 
Table V Source FED, SSBF 1998 and 1993, NSSBF 1987. Dependent variable is 5, if firm took advantage of all EPDs, 4 
if most of the time, 3 if around half the time, 2 if few times, 1 if never. Ordered Probit estimates. Robust standard errors  
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. †: limited liability firms. ‡: unlimited 
liability firms. §: limited liability firms managed by their owners. Sector, region and year dummies included. For columns 
(4)-(6), only 1993 and 1998. 
 
Results including all three years conﬁrm that the 1998 results in table IV
were not a peculiarity. Relationships continue to have value, which is what
columns (1) and (4) show: strength of relationships are associated with more
advantage of EPDs. The model estimated for all years does not include any
measure of ﬁrm credit worthiness.16 Still, the same result as in table IV arises.
For limited liability ﬁrms (column (2)), the ordered probit estimate implies that
a ﬁrm 10% more relational than an average limited liability ﬁrm has 20.6% more
chance of taking advantage of 100% of EPDs (p-value = 0.0%). For unlimited
liability, this eﬀect is 14.16% (p-value = 0.2%).
The omission of any measure of credit worthiness appears to bias the value
of relationships upward. In columns (5) and (6), owner delinquency is included,
which forces us to drop all 1987 observations. A result very similar to 1998
arises: while for limited liability ﬁrms, relationships are valuable, they do not
seem to matter for unlimited liability ﬁrms. For the former, a ﬁrm 10% more
relational than an average limited liability ﬁrm has 16.74% more chance of taking
advantage of 100% of EPDs (p-value = 0.0%).For the later, this eﬀect is only
16Credit score is available only for 1998. Owner delinquency only for 1993 and 1998.
146.24%, and not precisely estimated (p-value = 0.0%). Notice that the number
of observations on unlimited liability ﬁrms rises to 1028, which makes us more
comfortable that the result for 1998 is not driven by too few observations on
unlimited liability ﬁrms..
B. The value of relationships according to credit worthiness
Table VI shows results when the model in equation (1) is estimated according
to whether ﬁrms have bad or good credit score.17 In columns (1) and (3),
equation (1) is estimated for ﬁrms with a bad credit score, which can be thought
of as the most informationally opaque ﬁrms. Relationships are valuable for these
ﬁrms: the ordered probit coeﬃcient in column (1) means that a bad credit record
ﬁrm 10% more relational than the average ﬁrm has 14.6% more chance of taking
advantage of all EPDs oﬀered. When compared with ﬁrms with a good credit
record (columns (2) and (4)), one can see that relationships are more valuable
for more informationally opaque ﬁrms. However, relationships are also valuable
for good credit record ﬁrms: a good credit record ﬁrm 10% more relational than
the average ﬁrm has 9.5% more chance of taking advantage of all EPDs oﬀered.
Early Payment Discounts
  †(1) ‡(2)  †  (3)  ‡  (4) 
0.45 0.24  0.50  0.26  Log(Relational)  (0.22)** (0.13)* (0.22)**  (0.12)** 
-0.02 -0.39      Credi t Score  (0.12) (0.12)***     
-0.08 -0.14      Owner Delinquent?  (0.06) (0.12)     
0.04 0.04  0.05  0.04  Log(Cash/Assets)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
-0.05 -0.12  -0.05 -0.12  Log(Employee)  (0.07) (0.05)** (0.07) (0.05)** 
0.13 0.10  0.14  0.13  Log(Age of Firm)  (0.07)* (0.06) (0.07)*  (0.06)** 
0.02 0.06  0.03  0.07  Log(Assets)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)* 
-0.28 -0.16  -0.28 -0.21  MSA  (0.15)* (0.11) (0.15)*  (0.11)* 
-0.15 -0.08  -0.16 -0.10  HHI  (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) 
Obser vat ions  409 626 409 626 
Table VI Source FED, SSBF 1998. Dependent variable is 5, if firm took advantage of all 
EPDs, 4 if most of the time, 3 if around half the time, 2 if few times, 1 if never. Ordered 
Probit estimates. Robust standard errors  in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. †: Bad Credit Score (high and significant 
categories 3, 4 and 5). ‡: Good Credit Score (low and moderate risk). Sector and Region 
dummies included. 
 
17The sample could also be split according to whether the ﬁrm’s owner was delinquent or
not. There are, however, too few observations for which the owner was delinquent.
15This result can be alternatively interpreted as relationships being more valu-
able for ﬁrms under ﬁnancial distress. This could be so because relationships
produce private information above and beyond credit score, and therefore re-
lational lender are willing to fund ﬁrms in diﬃculty. Or, it could mean that
relational ﬁrms under distress get ﬁnanced because this is part of the equilib-
rium path in a repeated moral hazard game in which the continuation value of
relationships induce ﬁrm to take the action lenders want them to [see Boot and
Thakor [1994] and Carrasco and De Mello [2006]). Under the interpretation
that credit score measures ﬁnancial distress, relationships can be valuable both
as disciplining mechanism or as a technology to produce private information.
VC o n c l u s i o n
Our ﬁrst result, which is not a novelty, is that relationships matter. Just
as they did in late 1980s, they continued to do so in the late 1990s. Still, it
is informative to know why they matter. Our results indicate both theoretical
explanations, hidden information and hidden action, are relevant to explain
why relationships are valuable. However, ﬁrms hidden action seems, for this
application, more robust as an explanation.
It is not warranted to conclude from these results that hidden action is ﬁrst-
order relative to hidden information. Our measure of incentive misalignment
is stronger than our measure of informational opaqueness. Further empirical
research, specially in other empirical settings, is necessary to establish degrees
of importance. We can, however, be assertive that incentive reason seems at least
as important as the adverse selection reason. If this is so, one should be less
concerned about banking deregulation and consolidation as a harmful trend to
small ﬁrm lending. Relationships will have a better shot at surviving in the new
structure of the banking industry since large, more competitive banks, while
being disadvantaged at acquiring and using private information, do not have
an intrinsic disadvantage in using relationships as disciplining mechanism. The
geographical expansion of the banking industry can still harm small business for
reasons other than slashing relational ties between lender and borrowers. One
such reason is that small ﬁrms now compete for funds with more alternative
uses. Relationships however should survive, as the evidence that there are as
important in the late 1990 as they were in the late 1980 suggests.
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